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According to desire-based versions of reasons internalism, roughly yet famously, 
an agent A has a reason to φ just in case she or her idealized counterpart desires 
to φ.1 Unless further assumptions are made, it therefore seems like the reasons an 
agent has vary with their desires. For example, on Williams’ paradigmatic version of 
the view, an agent’s reasons must be such that they can be arrived at using a sound 
deliberative route from her present motivational set. But what such sets contain can 
vary enormously, so it seems like reasons can too (Williams, 1981).
Much of the debate surrounding desire-based reasons internalism has, under-
standably, focused on whether it can capture moral reasons well. Contra authors like 
Williams, it has often been argued that desire-based reasons internalism suitably 
understood in fact entails moral conclusions (e.g. Lindeman, 2019; Markovits, 2014; 
Smith, 1994; 2011; 2012; 2020; cf. Brunero, 2017; Bukoski, 2016; Joyce, 2001 for 
criticism). I do not aim to take a stand on this debate here.
This is because whatever we make of the arguments for or against moral reasons, 
there is another question which lurks in the background: namely, what exactly are 
the commitments of desire-based reasons internalism? This question is much broader 
than the question of whether the view entails moral reasons. In particular, the ques-
tion of whether there might be categorical reasons (in the sense of reasons which are 
shared by all) irrespectively of whether these count as moral reasons has not received 
much attention – even though desire-based reasons internalism has been a prominent 
account of reasons in the literature for decades. It would therefore be a remarkable 
upshot if desire-based reasons internalism would turn out to be committed to such 
reasons. To gain a fuller understanding of what desire-based reasons internalism 
commits us to, then, we ought to explore whether it commits us to such reasons.2
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2 Following Smith (1994), some have discussed whether the desires of ideal agents would converge to 
generate categorical reasons – Hubin (1999) and Joyce (2001) are particularly strong critics in my view 
(though cf. Smith, 2011; 2012; 2020). But this debate does not touch on specific non-moral possibilities.
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I aim to go some way towards doing so in this paper. Taking unexpected cues 
from Michelle Kosch’s recent work on J.G. Fichte (Kosch, 2015; 2018), I shall argue 
that desire-based reasons internalism, suitably understood, is committed to at least 
one categorical reason – and it does not rule out that there could be others. The rea-
son I shall defend is a (practical) reason to obtain or maintain knowledge about our 
surroundings. Using Fichte’s insights and some standard desire-based reasons inter-
nalist assumptions, my strategy shall be to argue that all ideal agents the desires of 
which explain reasons are committed to desiring such knowledge. As reasons inter-
nalism, suitably understood, takes our reasons to depend on their desires, it follows 
that all agents have such a reason. This reason counts as an internalist-style categori-
cal reason, but it is not obvious whether it has anything to do with morality.
To show this, I start in section (1) by outlining Kosch’s Fichte. In section (2), I 
raise some problems for the constitutive aims she attributes to him. In section (3), 
I argue that the main insights in the argument for them can be coopted in a reasons 
internalist framework, generating the conclusions just mentioned. In section (4), I 
evaluate whether the reason I have defended is a moral reason and argue that it is 
unclear whether it is one. I conclude in section (5).
1  Kosch’s Fichte
In recent work, Michelle Kosch has reconstructed Fichte’s moral philosophy and dif-
ferentiated it from Kant’s, making his innovations stand out. My aim is, however, to 
incorporate some of Fichte’s moves into an even more contemporary debate. That 
means that I shall not be concerned with historical accuracy, so I want to state imme-
diately that I am more interested in Kosch’s Fichte than in Fichte himself. Whether 
or not the rendition of his view I discuss is historically accurate is a question I will 
leave to others to answer. Nevertheless, I shall refer to Kosch’s Fichte as just ‘Fichte’ 
from here and on.
Fichte takes independence to be of central concern in both the philosophy of 
action and ethics. More specifically, he thinks that there are several constitutive aims 
of agency, meaning that there are several things agents aim at, and are agents in 
virtue of aiming at.3 The first aim is formal independence, which is perfection in the 
exercise of the disposition to set ends on the basis of concepts of ends through the 
activity of rational reflection (Kosch, 2018, ch. 4; cf. p. 152). That is a complicated 
way of saying that it is constitutive of agency to set ends (including forming plans or 
intentions) that the agent aims to live up to by reflecting on what to do.
However, agency also has the aim of material independence.4 An action lives up 
to this aim when it is part of a series of actions in the limit of which one would 
‘arrive at the state of absolute freedom from all limitation’ (Kosch, 2018, p. 39; 
cf. Fichte, 1798). What does that mean? Fichte seems to think that freedom from 
3 For more on the notion of constitutive aims, see Katsafanas (2013, ch. 2; 2018).
4 The ‘formal/material’ distinction here is obscure, but nothing in my argument turns on it, so it can be 
ignored for now.
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limitation is a telos of action the satisfaction of which one should maximize, and 
consequently that actions are better (or worse) to the extent that they live up to it or 
fail to do so.
Here, Fichte seems to claim that a formal notion of independence, as encapsu-
lated in his first constitutive aim, is not action-guiding. One can live up to that aim 
and still act in pretty much any way. However, the rational self has many properties 
of its own, and these set limitations on how one may act.5 Independence for the 
rational self, qua rational self, grounds three types of duties which are conducive to 
its material independence. These are duties concerning the preservation and devel-
opment of its physical power, of its intellect, and of coordinating its own and others’ 
activities.
It is unclear whether all this hangs together or is plausible. But regardless of what 
we make of Fichte’s framework in general, he seems committed to taking the aim of 
‘an environment secured against unpredictable, powerful forces of nature’ (Kosch, 
2018, p. 158) to be a sub-aim of the aim of material independence. That is what 
matters here.
More specifically, Fichte argues:
(1) An agent who aims to exercise her capacity rationally to set ends ought 
(ceteris paribus) to aim to obtain or maintain any conditions necessary for the 
exercise of that capacity.
(2) Possession of knowledge concerning causal regularities and concerning the 
disposition of items in the environment is a condition necessary for the exer-
cise of the capacity rationally to set ends.
(3) An agent who aims to exercise her capacity rationally to set ends ought 
(ceteris paribus) to aim to obtain or maintain of knowledge concerning causal 
regularities and concerning the disposition of items in the environment (1, 2).
(4) An environment secured against intervention by unpredictable, powerful 
forces uniquely facilitates the acquisition of knowledge concerning causal reg-
ularities and concerning the disposition of items in the environment.
(5) An agent who aims at acquiring knowledge concerning causal regularities 
and concerning the disposition of items in the environment ought (ceteris pari-
bus) to aim to obtain or secure any conditions uniquely facilitating its acquisi-
tion.
(6) An agent who aims at acquiring knowledge concerning causal regularities 
and concerning the disposition of items in the environment ought (ceteris pari-
bus) to aim to obtain or maintain an environment secured against intervention 
by unpredictable, powerful forces (4, 5).
5 These are: (i) the rational agent must be conscious of itself, (ii) it must have a nature, which is a system 
of drives, (iii) it must see itself as efficacious as a natural cause, so it must have a body which can be set 
in motion by its will, (iv) it has a drive towards independence, which only can be set in motion through 
the body, and as such the sustenance and perfection of the body are moral aims, (v) the reflecting ‘I’ must 
be an intellect, and hence the sustenance and perfection of it qua intellect is a similar aim, (vi) it is of 
limited external freedom due to its interaction with others, and others are also driven to independence, so 
its own drive towards it is limited by others’ similar aim (Kosch, 2018, ch. 2; p. 53).
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(7) An agent who aims to exercise her capacity rationally to set ends ought 
(ceteris paribus) to aim to obtain or maintain an environment secured against 
intervention by unpredictable, powerful forces (3, 6).
(8) Every rational agent aims to exercise her capacity rationally to set ends.
---
(C) Every rational agent ought (ceteris paribus) to aim to obtain or maintain 
an environment secured against intervention by unpredictable, powerful forces 
(7, 8).
This argument is taken verbatim from Kosch (2018, pp. 158-159).6 It is quite com-
plex and needs explication to make more sense. Premises (3), (6), (7) and the con-
clusion follow from other premises, but how are we to understand or motivate the 
others?
Premise (1) is formulated in terms of ‘[a]n agent who aims to exercise her capac-
ity rationally to set ends’ (Kosch, 2018, p. 159). That is another way to speak of the 
capacity of formal independence which Fichte takes to be constitutive of agency, as 
described above. Fichte thinks that if agents have that constitutive capacity and are 
instrumentally rational in the sense that they take necessary means to their ends, 
they are committed to the consequent of the premise, i.e. ‘to aim to obtain or main-
tain any conditions necessary for the exercise of that capacity.’ This is because the 
consequent specifies the necessary means they must take to exercise their formal 
constitutive aim of rationally setting ends.7
Premise (2) reads: ‘Possession of knowledge concerning causal regularities and 
concerning the disposition of items in the environment is a condition necessary for 
the exercise of the capacity rationally to set ends.’ It is supposed to be an expression 
of ‘the claim that empirical knowledge is required for the exercise of practical reflec-
tion that is part of rational agency’ (Kosch, 2018, pp. 159–160).
How come? Kosch – Fichte does not seem to put this point in the same way 
(Kosch, 2018, pp. 22-24) – argues that it is impossible to intentionally perform an 
action one does not have any idea about how to perform or aim at an end one has no 
idea about how to pursue. It follows that it is necessary to have at least some level of 
knowledge about one’s environment to form plans. Kosch is aware that these claims 
about the relation between intention-formation and knowledge are controversial, 
however, and therefore also supplies some additional reformulations of them.8 These 
reformulations need not concern us yet, however – I shall return to this argument 
below.
7 At least, this is the case on a narrow-scope interpretation of instrumental rationality, but the agent 
seems committed to the consequent even if instrumental rationality should be understood in a wide-scope 
manner. Giving up the capacities which are constitutive of agency rather than aiming to obtain or main-
tain the conditions which are necessary for its exercise is hardly a serious option for the agent.
8 Most importantly, she thinks one may reformulate the premise in terms of ‘true beliefs’ rather than 
‘knowledge’ (Kosch, 2018, p. 160).
6 For coherence, I have written that premise (3) comes from ‘(1, 2)’, not ‘(1 and 2)’, and for stylistic rea-
sons, her ‘(9)’ is my ‘(C).’
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Instead, we reach premise (4). It reads: ‘An environment secured against interven-
tion by unpredictable, powerful forces uniquely facilitates the acquisition of knowl-
edge concerning causal regularities and concerning the disposition of items in the 
environment.’ Why should we think this? Fichte seems to think that ‘an environ-
ment secured against unpredictable forces is required for an agent to have knowl-
edge of the means at her disposal in any given instance of practical deliberation’ 
(Kosch, 2018, p. 161). This is because an environment so secured allows the agent 
to increase the reach of her practical deliberation. In an insecure environment, the 
agent may have the means to her ends taken away from her while she acts, so she 
cannot enact the plans she aims to perform. On the other hand, in a secure environ-
ment, the agent is able to formulate and execute increasingly complex plans, freeing 
her from external limitations (as per the aim of material independence).
Fichte uses considerations like the one just mentioned to justify the institution of 
property (Kosch, 2018, pp. 75–77), but Kosch expands on his points and generalizes 
them to causal knowledge in general, whether or not it is related to property. How-
ever, she also departs from Fichte’s considerations in two ways to generate (4) as it 
stands here.
First, she denies that a secure environment is ‘required’ – or a necessary condi-
tion – for the relevant kind of knowledge, instead preferring the language of ‘unique 
facilitation.’ This is for two reasons. First, even Fichte seems to allow that it is not 
necessary for us to counteract natural forces when we act. If we know enough about 
them, we can plan around them. For example, instead of using a mosquito net to 
counteract mosquito bites, we can (in principle) avoid sleeping in places where mos-
quitos risk biting us. Hence, it is not necessary for us to secure our environment 
against mosquito bites. Second, we do not need full control of our environment to 
learn about it. Sometimes just observing it is enough. It follows that a secure envi-
ronment is not necessary for knowledge, though it does – Kosch thinks – uniquely 
facilitate it.
Moreover, Kosch also argues that we need general knowledge of our environment 
rather than knowledge which merely would enable us to act at the present moment. 
To defend this claim, she first agrees with writers like Nagel (1970) and Parfit 
(1984) that we should not privilege our present deliberation over our future delibera-
tion. Our temporal location makes no difference. Second, she adds that deliberation 
can be creative and involves making increasingly complex plans over time. If so, 
we need more knowledge than what we have at present. With these points and some 
other Fichtean premises, she formulates an argument for (4) as she states it herself 
– but we do not need to be concerned with the exact details of that argument here.
Premise (5) is another application of the instrumental principle. The premise 
reads: ‘An agent who aims at acquiring knowledge concerning causal regularities 
and concerning the disposition of items in the environment ought (ceteris paribus) 
to aim to obtain or secure any conditions uniquely facilitating its acquisition.’ The 
idea here is that acquiring knowledge concerning causal regularities and disposi-
tions of items in the environment is uniquely facilitated by the conditions that facili-
tate it, so one ought to attain it by instrumental rationality (Kosch 2018, p. 159).
Finally, premise (8) is the last controversial premise. It reads: ‘Every rational 
agent aims to exercise her capacity rationally to set ends.’ Kosch claims that she 
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‘[has] nothing to say in defense of (8) that goes beyond the defenses already abun-
dant in the contemporary Kantian literature’ (Kosch, 2018, p. 159). It would be nice 
to know which defences Kosch has in mind here, but I will not push this point. We 
can assume (8) for now, for the problems I shall identify for Fichte’s argument come 
earlier.
2  Problems for the Controversial Premises
I have now explicated Fichte’s argument for why security from unpredictable and 
powerful forces of nature is constitutive of agency. But is it plausible? I shall empha-
size problems for two premises that, later, shall lead to my reformulation of the argu-
ment. They are premises (1) and (4). In the next section, I shall argue that (1) may be 
reformulated to avoid the problems I shall present for it. However, the problems for 
(4) seem to me decisive, so I shall not discuss the remaining premises after I have 
dealt with (4).
Let us start with premise (1). Here, as mentioned, Fichte appeals to ‘[a]n agent 
who aims to exercise her capacity rationally to set ends.’ This is his understanding of 
the formal constitutive aim of agency. The first problem with this capacity is that it 
is unclear why an agent (or even a rational agent) would have to (or have to aim to) 
exercise her capacity to set ends to be an agent (or a rational agent). This looks like 
a kind of overintellectualization. Agents need not engage in deliberation to set their 
ends. And if it is not constitutive of agency, rational or not, to have such a capacity, 
Fichte’s argument does not hold for all relevant agents.
Why is Fichte overintellectualizing? Some ends seem to occur naturally – desires 
for food, drink, sleep, pleasure, and what have you plausibly just stem from our bio-
logical hardwiring. Such desires can plausibly feature in plans, intentions, aims, 
ends, and similar without us having to do any cognitive work to reach them.9 Hence, 
there is no need to appeal to any rational or reflective end-setting capacity to gener-
ate the ends that an agent may have. Hence, it is not constitutive of agency to set 
ends.
Perhaps Fichte could reply by trying to interpret these ends as ‘mere inclinations’ 
or ‘brute desires’ or something like that, where they do not quite qualify as ends, in 
his sense, whatever else that involves. But that is hardly plausible for all our actual 
ends. The desires for food, drink, sleep, and pleasure are hardly ‘mere’ or ‘brute’ 
in any sense according to which they count as less important than more cognitively 
refined ends – if any ends are common among humans, these are. Hence, they plau-
sibly count as ends, or at least the bases out of which we unproblematically form 
ends, without the need for any cognitive or rational machinery. Again, Fichte seems 
to overintellectualize our end-setting.
A second problem for premise (1) is that even granting that agents have a rational 
capacity to set ends, the exercise of the capacity should not plausibly be construed 
9 Even if they do not do so for us, there are possible agents for whom that can be the case. The reader 
should easily be able to think of examples.
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in a way where instrumental rationality necessarily applies to it. If that is the case, 
there is no reason for us to connect the capacity to set ends to us having knowl-
edge of our circumstances. Aiming to make use of the capacity to set ends rationally 
need not have anything to do with aiming to do so in a way that makes instrumental 
rationality apply.
The reason we need not connect a capacity of instrumental rationality to the exer-
cise of the capacity to set ends is that the capacity to set ends need not be exercised 
in action or conscious deliberation. Sometimes we set our ends actively and through 
deliberation. But often we form plans or intentions without any prior aim of doing 
so. For example, if I am walking down the street and I see a venomous snake on the 
pavement in front of me, I do not need to deliberate or perform any other action to 
make a decision to walk somewhere where I avoid it. I just form the plan or intention 
to walk elsewhere than in its path.10
Because of the non-conscious way in which I form my intention here, a principle 
of instrumental rationality need not have any bearing on the exercise of the capacity 
to form the end. On a rough yet standard formulation, instrumental rationality regu-
lates the relation between my ends and means; if I aim (desire or intend) to φ, and 
I believe ψ is a necessary means to φ, I am irrational if I do not (or do not desire or 
intend) to ψ. But one need not aim to exercise one’s capacity for intention-formation 
to exercise it – it is just not the sort of thing that one needs to aim at exercising to 
exercise. Hence, it seems like a category mistake to connect instrumental rationality 
to the capacity to set ends. While we may aim to set ends, we need not do so.
Now to premise (4). It reads: ‘An environment secured against intervention by 
unpredictable, powerful forces uniquely facilitates the acquisition of knowledge con-
cerning causal regularities and concerning the disposition of items in the environ-
ment.’ The premise is hard to interpret – what is an ‘environment’, for example, let 
alone a ‘secure’ one? What does it mean for a force to be ‘unpredictable’ or ‘power-
ful’? Regardless of how we should interpret the details, however, the core idea here 
is that knowledge of an environment will be uniquely facilitated by its being secured 
against the intervention of unpredictable, powerful forces. As per the discussion of 
(4) above, Fichte and Kosch are worried about how hard it is to acquire knowledge 
in insecure environments. Instead, they think that such knowledge is ‘uniquely facil-
itated’ if the environment is secured against unpredictable, powerful forces. How-
ever, I shall present three counterexamples to the premise. The first two apply to 
any plausible interpretation of what counts as an environment. The third assumes, I 
10 Why could that intention not be formed because of some non-occurent or backgrounded intention to 
avoid venomous snakes that I already have, which I in turn have formed due to an action? There can be 
such cases – if I have travelled somewhere where I risk encountering venomous snakes, I may well have 
formed a conditional intention about what to do if I were to encounter one prior to walking down the 
street. But there are also cases where I have not considered that option. Perhaps I am walking down the 
street in an area where no venomous snakes ordinarily live, but the one I encounter has just been dropped 
from a helicopter passing by. It would be unreasonable to expect people to have deliberated about what to 
do on such occasions.
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think rightly, that the environments themselves sometimes can include powerful and 
unpredictable forces. The cases add up to two main problems.11
First, the premise seems false. I grew up close to wild nature. There were several 
large animals that I sometimes could spot in the woods in the area – lynx and moose, 
for example. But I was under no threat of natural disasters like tsunamis. Assume, 
however, that everything would have been the same except that the area would suf-
fer from tsunamis every now and then (without anyone knowing exactly when they 
would occur, so they would  still count as unpredictable). Why would the risk of 
tsunamis affect my – or a team of scientists’ – ability to observe the mammals in the 
area? Perhaps I (or they) would not get out into the local forest as often to observe 
them if there had been a risk of tsunamis. But we should still easily be able to get 
out often enough to observe the animals and learn many interesting things about 
them. It would take a very extreme environment for us to not be able to observe the 
animals every now and then.
Hence, premise (4) seems inflated. Environments at risk of suffering from the 
effects of unpredictable, powerful forces of nature can be secure enough for gath-
ering knowledge. Therefore, secure environments do not ‘uniquely facilitate’ the 
knowledge Fichte thinks agents need.
But there is an even greater problem for (4). Insecure environments often seem 
better at providing us with knowledge about causal regularities or the dispositions 
of items in them than secure ones do. There are two kinds of counterexample cases 
that support this conclusion. First, the causal regularities or dispositions might be 
hard to systematize. Assume again that we are trying to learn something about the 
behaviour of the local fauna. But assume also that the local fauna is able to behave 
in many different ways. We may then very well learn more about its behaviour in 
an insecure environment than in a secure one, for the insecure environment may 
elicit more behaviours from the animals. Birds that ordinarily nest in treetops may 
start to nest on the ground if a tsunami has knocked all the trees over, for exam-
ple. Secure environments would not facilitate knowledge of nesting behaviour under 
such conditions.
In the light of the second kind of cases, premise (4) even risks being self-defeat-
ing. As Kosch does not say what an ‘environment’ is supposed to be, I shall make an 
assumption: an environment can include unpredictable, powerful forces. This seems 
plausible enough – if whatever is in an environment is a part of it, and tsunamis are 
in some environment, they are part of it. But if so, we can learn a lot about environ-
ments that include unpredictable and powerful forces, including things about those 
forces themselves, because they intervene in the environment. It is hard to predict 
everything of interest about how a tsunami may impact us, but we may learn more 
by observing what impact it has on us after it has had an impact. Hence, securing an 
environment from unpredictable, powerful forces risks giving us less knowledge of 
the environment than if it had been insecure, generating a kind of self-defeat.
11 One could even think of them as elaborations of Kosch’s arguments for why (4) should be formulated 
in terms of ‘unique facilitation’. But the problems go deeper than she appears to presume.
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I conclude that premise (4) is unworkable. We can often gain as much knowledge 
of an environments when it is subject to unpredictable, powerful forces as when it 
is secured from them. In many cases, we can even gain more knowledge of it when 
such forces affect it.
Could Fichte say anything about this? In Kosch (2015), Kosch presents a much 
weaker version of the argument above. It looks like this:
(1’) An agent with an interest in the exercise of her capacity rationally to set 
ends ought (ceteris paribus) to have an interest in the obtaining of any condi-
tions necessary for the exercise of that capacity.
(2’) (Relevant) knowledge is a condition necessary for the exercise of the 
capacity rationally to set ends.
(3’) Control of (some part of) the environment is a necessary condition of (rel-
evant) knowledge.
---
(C’) An agent with an interest in the exercise of her capacity to set ends ought 
(ceteris paribus) to have an interest in control of (some part of) her environ-
ment.
Fichte could accept (3’) instead of (4), and then try reformulate the rest of the argu-
ment by appealing to control of one’s environment rather than security from ‘unpre-
dictable, powerful forces.’ But I doubt this would help much. The tsunami cases 
should easily be able to show us that control is not a necessary condition for knowl-
edge. Hence, versions of the counterexamples I just presented for (4) reappear here, 
mutatis mutandis. Fichte’s argument seems over by premise (4).
3  The Fichtean Lesson
I have now criticized premises (1) and (4) in Fichte’s argument. As mentioned, I 
think (1) can be reformulated, but the arguments against (4) are decisive. This takes 
us to the constructive part of the paper. Its aim is, after all, to make use of Fichte’s 
insights in the context of reasons internalism. With his line of thought presented and 
evaluated, it is now time to do just that. I shall start off by reformulating (1). But to 
do that, I shall first introduce desire-based reasons internalism in greater depth.
Desire-based reasons internalism, as I understand it, says that our reasons depend 
on our desires. Here we may make a distinction. Either reasons depend on an agent’s 
actual desires or on her ideal desires. I will help myself to the ideal desires view 
here and make use of it in the rest of my argument as it is the one I prefer (Leffler, 
2016; 2019; 2020).12 A rough definition is the following (cf. Leffler, 2019; 2020):
12 On Schroeder’s influential 2007 view, things might look different here. For Schroeder, roughly, any 
fact which is conducive to the satisfaction of an agent’s desires is a reason. Being such that one has a lot 
of knowledge is presumably conducive to that, so he seems to get the reason I want to defend very easily.
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(IDEAL DESIRES INTERNALISM) For all r(F,A,α,C), r(F,A,α,C) is a reason 
relation holding between a fact F and an agent A’s action a in circumstances 
C iff (and because) r(F,A,α,C) holds in virtue of the desires that feature in P’s 
idealized psychology.
 Here, I do not concern myself with the exact interpretation of metaphysical details 
like what a fact, a desire, an action, or the ‘in virtue of’-relation are, though I shall 
use the conventional terminology of grounding for the latter for simplicity (Chang, 
2013). I shall, however, say something more about how A and C work.
First, what does ‘the desires that feature in P’s idealized psychology’ mean? Like 
most ideal desires internalists, I shall assume that the agent whose desires explain 
reasons has desires, beliefs, and is suitably rational. Desire-based reasons internal-
ism need not be committed to the Humean theory of motivation, but it is still pre-
sumed that agents generally act in virtue of the features of this kind of psychology. 
Moreover, the mental states of ideal agents are idealized – idealization plays a role 
in ensuring us that the desires we have are those that plausibly can explain reasons. I 
shall follow convention and call the relevant fully idealized agents ‘A+’, while non-
idealized ones remain called ‘A’ below. A+ is a hypothetical idealized version of A, 
but like A in all other respects.
What does the idealization of A+ involve? Philosophers unsurprisingly adduce 
different conditions, but there is wide agreement on at least the following ones:
(i) A+ is rational, in some sense of rationality. Most internalists interpret this 
demand weakly, referring to internal coherence, though there are also some 
stronger interpretations (cf. Jian, 2021).
(ii) A+’s psychology is fit for its purpose. For example, if the agent’s mental 
states are given a functionalist interpretation, she is not supposed to have a 
psychology where her functionality is impaired.
(iii) A+ has the right psychology to explain reasons, such as some set of true 
beliefs or knowledge (Williams, 1981; Smith, 1994), or even special desires 
(Leffler, 2020; Smith, 2011; 2012; 2020).13
I shall assume that some versions of (i)-(iii) hold for ideal agents, and that it is ideal 
desires based on these conditions that ground A’s reasons. With IDEAL DESIRES 
INTERNALISM now presented, we can use the assumptions behind A+ to develop 
Fichte’s ideas. I shall start by developing premise (1) in his argument into (1*):
(1*) If an agent is an ideal agent with a possibly varying set of desires, the 
agent ought to desire to obtain or maintain any conditions necessary for acting 
on its possibly varying desires.
The major shift from (1) here is that I talk about a possibly varying set of desires 
rather than a capacity to set ends that an agent may exercise. This reflects how 
desires feature in IDEAL DESIRES INTERNALISM. Ordinary agents sometimes 
13 The former has sometimes been called an assumption of rationality (e.g. Smith, 1994, ch. 5). Kosch 
does this too (2018, p. 24), but I think it is too strong for that.
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change their desires in the light of new experiences, reasoning, etc., and ideal agents 
do so as well, not least as a matter of their idealization (as I shall argue below).14 
Moreover, I have changed ‘aim to obtain or maintain (…)’ to ‘desire to obtain or 
maintain (…).’ This change is also implied by IDEAL DESIRES INTERNALISM, 
for there aims are conceived of as desires. For simplicity, I have also formulated the 
premise as a conditional and removed the ceteris paribus-clause, as it is unclear how 
we should spell out which conditions are equal or not – but the reader is free to read 
(1*) with one if she so wishes.
With the clarifications in place, the core idea in (1*) is that ideal agents ought to 
desire to obtain or maintain any conditions necessary for acting on their possibly 
varying desires – including those of possible desires that they do not currently have. 
I emphasize ‘possibly varying’ desires here because the desires of ideal agents are 
highly variable. They are set up to go through new experiences, reason, use their 
imagination, etc., which enables their desires to change. This is because the point of 
idealization is that they are supposed to acquire desire sets that ground reasons, and 
non-ideal desire sets often fail to do that.15
This means that an ideal agent’s desire set can vary, but with a highly varying set 
of desires, it is likely that the ideal agent will end up in situations where they can-
not act on their desires. Perhaps they are in circumstances where other agents will 
stop them from acting on their desires, or perhaps they do not have the knowledge 
necessary for satisfying them. But the ideal agent should be such that their actions 
could be driven even by their possibly varying desires. This is because acting on 
their possible desires is likely to have further effects on A+’s desire sets, and there-
fore also on the reasons of non-ideal agents. Hence, ideal agents who are not in the 
right conditions to act on their possibly varying desires fail to live up to condition 
(iii) above. As their desire sets are likely to be altered by acting on their possibly 
varying desires, they do not have the right psychologies if they do not.16
Why? As L.A. Paul has stressed, the first-personal experience of many kinds of 
events is likely to alter someone in unpredictable ways. One is likely to go through 
transformative experiences (Paul, 2014). Maybe some of A+’s desires become 
strengthened or weakened if they act on them, maybe acting on some desires will 
give them important knowledge of the experience of acting on them, or maybe A+ 
15 Consider, for example, the famous case of someone who desires to drink a glass of petrol rather than a 
glass of gin because they do not know what the glass contains (Williams, 1981).
16 Does this argument imply that the ideal agent ought to have desires for pretty much everything and act 
on them all, as potentially all courses of action and knowledge might affect their desire set? Maybe, but 
my formulation is less ambitious. I have not specified which alterations might matter, and possibly these 
are limited by the agent’s present desires. If neither A nor A+ care one iota about 80s cartoons, it is hard 
to see how watching them would necessitate any relevant effects.
14 It is conceivable that there are non-ideal agents the desires of which cannot possibly change, in some 
sense of possibility, but it is possible for ideal agents to change their desires in any relevant sense of pos-
sibility, whatever it might be, as that is necessary for idealization to work. I want to thank an anonymous 
reviewer for pushing me to clarify this.
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might form or lose some desires. These effects matter for which reasons A has based 
on A+’s desires.17
Assume that A has a desire to go to university but does not know what to study. 
As A learns more about philosophy, A considers studying it to the PhD level – but 
whether A has reason to study it depends on A+’s desires, not on A’s present desires. 
However, if A+ were to go to grad school, A+ could find their desire for philosophy 
becoming stronger or weaker with the experience of doing so or find that they have 
new knowledge of what it is like to do a PhD after having done it. This knowledge 
could even impact whether they find philosophy enjoyable or inspire some other 
desire. Perhaps A+ enjoys brainstorming but not conference presentations, so they 
form a desire to engage in a line of work where they would get to brainstorm more 
but go to conferences less. These desires on A+’s parts will determine A’s reasons 
– but A+ could not have formed them without going to grad school in philosophy. 
They are based on the transformative experiences of going there. Just imagining 
what it is like to go there says little about what it it is like to do so, so A+ needs to 
go there rather than just imagine what it is like.
All this holds even if going to grad school is not something that A or A+ had been 
able to do at the start of the idealization process. A is setting out to go to university, 
and is not likely to have the knowledge necessary for a PhD in philosophy. But if so, 
not having the relevant conditions in place for acting on their possibly varying desire 
to go to grad school in philosophy entails that they could not have access to experi-
ences necessary to attain the right desires to explain A’s reasons. So A+ needs the 
right background conditions.
A+ should, then, desire to obtain or maintain the relevant necessary conditions 
rather than just be in them. This is because she is like the non-ideal agent in all 
respects except those in which she is idealized. Because ideal agents are in many 
ways like ordinary human agents, the conditions necessary for acting on the vary-
ing set of desires may have to be acquired, or they may be lost. For example, they 
may have learned or forgot relevant knowledge – just think of what is necessary to 
get into grad school in the first place. However, with a desire to maintain or obtain 
the conditions necessary for acting on their possibly varying desires, the ideal agent 
will be motivated to possess them even when they lack them or could lose them. So 
a desire to obtain or maintain the conditions necessary for acting on their possibly 
varying desires would ensure their being ideal. Hence, they need the desire – so (1*) 
is defended.
My formulation of the premise can also avoid the problems I presented for 
Fichte’s (1). The first problem is the overintellectualization involved in taking agents 
to be constituted by Fichte’s capacity to set ends. But I have, instead, talked about 
the desires of ideal agents. From the formulation of reasons internalism, an agent 
17 Some have argued against IDEAL DESIRES INTERNALISM by appealing to how desires may 
change  in problematic ways when agents become idealized (e.g. Gibbard, 1990; Sobel, 2001; cf. also 
references related to ‘the conditional fallacy’ in fn. 19). Those arguments do not convince me, but dis-
cussing the issue in depth is outside the scope of this paper. My argument here just needs the point that 
first-personal experience can affect desires in a way which affects reasons, and that claim is plausible 
whatever one makes of this debate.
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already has a set of desires, and the one defended here is added for the sake of 
proper idealization. There is no end-setting capacity involved here.
The second problem for Fichte is that there seems to be an illicit use of instru-
mental rationality in his (1). Instrumental rationality does, in general, not need to 
have anything to do with making use of the capacity to set ends. However, we can 
defend (1*) by appealing to the notion of ideal agency rather than with instrumental 
rationality, for both ideal and ordinary agents can act based on their desires on the 
conception of agency typically defended by reasons internalists.
We can, then, also reformulate (2) to (2*):
(2*) If the agent ought to desire to obtain or maintain any conditions necessary 
for acting on her possibly varying desires, then she ought to desire to obtain 
knowledge concerning causal regularities and concerning the disposition of 
items in the environment.
(2*) has also been reformulated into a conditional, but I do not think it needs much 
more defence. Kosch’s argument for (2) premise seems plausible to me, but I can 
also adduce a much less controversial consideration in favour of (2*) than she did 
for (2), hence yielding a stronger defence of (2*).
More specifically, I can appeal to variability again. As A+’s desire set may change 
in idealization, A+ seems in need of a significant amount of knowledge about her 
surroundings to act on many different possible desires that may be acquired in that 
process. Knowledge about many possible means and outcomes is a necessary condi-
tion for acting on many potential desires. Hence (2*) seems plausible, whatever one 
thinks of Kosch’s defence of it.
Some more clarification could help here. First, we are talking about real knowl-
edge here, regardless of how we interpret knowledge. The argument from variability 
does not, therefore, indicate that A+ has a pragmatic reason to believe what would 
satisfy their or A’s desires. They may have such a pragmatic reason, but that is not 
what I am arguing. Rather, they should desire to obtain or maintain knowledge.
Second, Kosch claims that she can run her argument by appealing to true belief 
rather than knowledge, as that may be enough for action (cf. fn. 8 above). This might 
work, but formulating (2) or (2*) in terms of ‘true beliefs’ seems too concessive. 
This is because differentiating between, and asking about the relative values of, true 
belief and knowledge here is to raise the Meno problem in the context of true beliefs 
about means to take to satisfy one’s possibly varying desires. One is essentially ask-
ing ‘Why does knowledge matter more than true belief?’. That question is far too 
big to settle here. However, because knowledge (and not just true belief) typically is 
taken to be the paradigmatic mental state reflecting the world, I shall, more boldly 
just write as if what matters here is knowledge rather than mere true belief.
With (1*) and (2*) in place, we get the following argument:
(1*) If an agent is an ideal agent with a possibly varying set of desires, the 
agent ought to desire to obtain or maintain any conditions necessary for acting 
on her possibly varying desires.
(2*) If the agent ought to desire to obtain or maintain any conditions necessary 
for acting on her possibly varying desires, then she ought to desire to obtain 
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knowledge concerning causal regularities and concerning the disposition of 
items in the environment.
---
(3*) If an agent is ideal agent with a possibly varying set of desires, then she 
ought to desire to obtain or maintain knowledge concerning causal regularities 
and concerning the disposition of items in the environment.
A+ ought then to form this desire. She would not have the right mental states for 
being ideal if she did not. More specifically, she ought to form – and therefore has, 
in virtue of being ideal – a desire to obtain or maintain knowledge concerning causal 
regularities and concerning the disposition of items in the environment. In short, she 
ought to desire to obtain or maintain knowledge about her surroundings.
The upshot here is big. Using the basic conceptual move of IDEAL DESIRES 
INTERNALISM, with (3*), we can generate a reason for actual agents to attain 
knowledge of their surroundings. As A+’s desires ground A’s reasons, it follows that 
if A+ has a desire to obtain or maintain knowledge about the environment, A has a 
reason to obtain or maintain such knowledge. As IDEAL DESIRES INTERNALISM 
is a theory of reasons for action, this is a reason to learn relevant things and to make 
sure that one does not forget them, not a reason for belief.18
Just how we have that reason does, however, vary with different forms of IDEAL 
DESIRES INTERNALISM. There are two main versions (Smith, 1995).19 One treats 
the ideal agent as an exemplar. On that view, roughly, A has reason to φ if A+ 
desires to φ in any given case. If so, A has a reason to obtain or maintain knowledge 
to the extent that A+ desires to do so.
Alternatively, one may treat the ideal agent as an advisor, where the idea is that 
A’s reasons to φ depend on what A+ would advise A, qua actual agent, to do. If so, 
roughly, A has a reason to φ in C just in case A+ would advise them to φ. This rea-
son will remain categorical in the sense that all A+’s will have the same desire and 
therefore advise A to obtain and maintain knowledge at some points, but just when 
A+ would advise A to attain such knowledge is an additional question. Fortunately, 
it is not one that needs to be settled here. It is extremely likely that A+ sometimes 
would advise A to learn more about the world in the light of A+’s desire to do so. 
How else would A be able to take means to her ends, not least given that A’s own 
desires could vary over time?
There is an important worry here, however. As ideal agents are ideal, we may 
wonder why they would need desires to obtain or maintain knowledge in the first 
place. Perhaps they already have all relevant knowledge, and hence the desire is 
unnecessary? When I defended (1*) above, I argued that because ideal agents are 
in many ways similar to ordinary human agents, the conditions necessary for action 
18 It might, however, look similar to reasons for belief according to instrumentalists about epistemic rea-
sons (e.g. Cowie, 2014; Kornblith, 2002). Their idea is that R is a reason to believe that p because R 
improves the satisfiability of our desires. However, the reason to know is just a practical reason to learn 
or remember important things – it does not say anything about epistemic reasons.
19 The debate between them is vexed (cf. e.g. Johnson, 1997; 1999; Tubert, 2016; Wiland, 2000; 2003). I 
prefer the advisor view.
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can be gained or lost. But maybe knowledge cannot. It is often thought to be the 
kind of mental state that we just should assume ideal agents have (cf. condition (iii) 
in the characterization of IDEAL DESIRES INTERNALISM above).
However, like ordinary agents, ideal agents are able to gain or lose their knowl-
edge, so knowledge should be treated like other kinds of necessary conditions for 
acting on possibly varying desires. This means that because they may gain or lose 
it, they ought to desire it rather than just have it. They may, for example, either risk 
forgetting or actually forget something important. But a desire to know would moti-
vate them to obtain or maintain the knowledge in question. With relevant (and suf-
ficiently strong) desires, they would remember or re-learn important things.
Why should we treat knowledge as similar to other conditions rather than some-
thing ideal agents always necessarily have? I have stressed above that the ideal agent 
should be treated as similar to a real agent, idealization aside. But the idealization 
of the ideal agent does not imply that they always are in ideal circumstances them-
selves. They need to be able to, for example, exist in a world where a strong blow 
to the head could make them risk forgetting or actually forget what they know. That 
experience could by itself be transformative, just like the experience of various 
actions, including that of going to grad school in philosophy. Therefore, the first-
personal experience of a blow to the head will matter for explaining the reasons of 
A’s reasons (and not least if A, too, has undergone such a blow to the head) – the 
shape of A+’s desire set is likely to be altered by experiencing the blow, forgetting 
important things, and then relearning them. Hence, just taking A+ to always have 
the right knowledge makes them too ideal, but the desire will explain how they can 
be ideal in the right way.
4  What Kind of Reason?
I have now defended the claim that IDEAL DESIRES INTERNALISM is committed 
to a reason to obtain or maintain knowledge. What kind of reason is that? I have 
mentioned above that I take the reason to be categorical. It is categorical in the sense 
that (i) qua reason, it has normative force (because if any practical reasons have, 
this one has too), and (ii) all agents have it (because all their idealized counterparts 
whose desires ground reasons have it). The kind of categoricity at work here is 
defended by Smith (1994, ch. 5), and Joyce (2001) also uses it in his reasons inter-
nalist argument for an error theory about morality. As such, it is a standard reasons 
internalist way to think of categoricity, and one which this reason satisfies.
Is it also a moral reason? This is not the place to determine what makes a 
reason a moral reason, but we can evaluate whether the reason to know counts 
as one according to the leading accounts of what it is to be a moral reason in the 
literature. There are at least four different ways to explicate that distinction – or, 
alternatively, one may deny that there is a distinction.20 I shall argue that these 
20 Potentially, one could also combine some of the four ways of explicating it into more complex 
accounts. But the problems for the less complex account would then carry over to the complex ones.
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accounts often give unclear or conflicting verdicts regarding the reason to obtain 
or maintain knowledge that I have suggested. The upshot is that we do not know 
whether the reason to obtain or maintain knowledge is a moral reason.
I follow Forcehimes & Semrau (2018) in distinguishing between different 
accounts of the relation between moral and non-moral reasons. The first view 
they consider is:
(PLURAL GROUNDS) There are reasons of fundamentally different kinds, 
which differ with respect to their ultimate grounds. The ultimate grounds of 
moral reasons are distinguishable from the ultimate grounds of non-moral 
reasons. (Forcehimes & Semrau, 2018, p. 701)
There are two versions of this view. The first is due to Southwood (2011). Here, 
reasons that are based on social grounds are non-moral, whereas those that are 
based on non-social grounds are moral. Clearly, the reason to obtain or maintain 
knowledge is moral on that view – it has nothing to do with sociality.
Second, they consider a Kant-inspired view according to which categorical 
reasons are moral, but non-categorical ones are not. The reason to gain knowl-
edge seems straightforwardly categorical – I just argued that it was – and hence 
moral here. However, the reason to know one’s surroundings is not categorical 
on this view if categoricity is taken to mean something else than that the reason 
is applicable to all relevant agents, like reasons internalists might think. Perhaps 
one thinks that a categorical reason is one that is based on a desire-independent 
value. As such, there is still some unclarity about what it should count as here. 
A defender of the Kantian view would have to say more about what categoricity 
means for us to be able to see whether the reason to obtain or maintain knowledge 
counts as categorical and therefore moral.
Forcehimes and Semrau also consider content-based views of the distinction 
between moral and non-moral reasons. First, they discuss views about reasons 
according to which ‘moral reasons share, while non-moral reasons lack, an inti-
mate connection to responsibility. This connection, in contemporary guise, links 
moral reasons to reactive attitudes such as praise, blame, and indignation’ (Force-
himes & Semrau, 2018, p. 707). Second, they discuss views according to which 
moral reasons are other-regarding, whereas non-moral reasons are self-regarding 
(Forcehimes & Semrau, 2018, pp. 710–715).
It is hard to know what to make of the connection to responsibility. Are we 
responsible for acquiring knowledge about our circumstances so we can act? 
Maybe. Innocence may or may not be criticizable. Someone who lacks knowl-
edge of the evils of the world might seem to be outside the responsibility game 
altogether. But, simultaneously, naïve agents who do not know what they need to 
know often seem more than criticizable for that very reason.
Unfortunately, this issue gets messier still, for it is not clear in what sense 
someone who lacks knowledge is criticizable. It seems eminently plausible to 
think that there can be distinctly epistemic senses of praise, blame, and indigna-
tion, and these need not be related to our moral evaluations. Even if it is epistemi-
cally blameworthy to fail to proportion one’s belief to the evidence, it would still 
have been morally praiseworthy to do so if that would have prevented WWII. As 
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such, the responsibility view requires significant additional explication to indicate 
much.
The other-directedness view is, however, clearer. The reason to generate knowl-
edge is not other-directed, so if that is how one thinks of moral reasons, it is not a 
moral reason. This criterion, therefore, stands in conflict with (at least) the PLURAL 
GROUNDS views, according to which the reason to obtain or maintain knowledge 
does seem moral (at least at first glance).
I have now considered the views distinguished by Forcehimes & Semrau. On 
PLURAL GROUNDS views, the reason to know seems to be a moral reason. The 
responsibility view, it is unclear whether it is one. And on the other-regardingness 
view, it does not seem to be one. As such, it is quite unclear whether we should think 
of the reason to know one’s surroundings as a moral reason – whether we should do 
so or not depends on where we go on the moral/non-moral distinction.
However, one could also think that there is no real distinction between moral and 
other (practical) reasons. On this view, practical reasons are just practical reasons. 
Nothing makes a reason a moral reason rather than a non-moral reason: the distinc-
tion is superfluous. But if so, the reason to know could still hardly qualify as dis-
tinctively moral because there are no distinctively moral reasons in the first place. 
Hence, we cannot count the reason to know as a distinctively moral reason on the 
view where there is no difference between moral and other practical reasons either. 
Of course, we cannot count it as a distinctively non-moral reason either, because 
there are, simultaneously, no such reasons. But that is neither here nor there. It is not 
a distinctively moral reason, because on this view, there are no such reasons.
5  Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that ideal desire internalists are committed to at least 
one categorical reason for action, namely, a reason to obtain or maintain knowledge 
of our surroundings. I first presented Kosch’s Fichte, but then criticized Fichte’s 
argument at some length. However, I plugged some Fichtean insights into IDEAL 
DESIRES INTERNALISM and defended a categorical reason to obtain or maintain 
knowledge of one’s surroundings. I also argued that is it highly unclear whether this 
reason should count as a moral reason. This means that desire-based reasons inter-
nalism seems committed to more than one previously might have expected.
The reason to know also gives rise to interesting theoretical possibilities. I have 
not addressed the question of whether there might be other categorical reasons that 
could be defended in the same way as the reason to know above. It would be intrinsi-
cally interesting to inquire into whether any could be – and making sense of them 
might even have other theoretical payoffs downstream. It has often been argued that 
desire-based reasons internalism is implausible because it might imply that agents 
have too few or too many reasons if they desire the wrong things. But if ideal agents 
are committed to the right desires, perhaps that worry can be ameliorated. For now, 
however, these are possibilities for future research. This paper has defended a cat-
egorical reason to know.
 O. Leffler
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